The Effects of Political and Fiscal Incentives on Local Government Behavior – An Analysis of Fiscal Slack in China by Wang, Wen
The Effects of Political and Fiscal Incentives on Local Government Behavior 
–An Analysis of Fiscal Slack in China
WEN WANG 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY-PURDUE UNIVERSITY INDIANAPOLIS 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
This is the author's manuscript of the article published in final edited form as: 
Wang, W. (2016). The Effects of Political and Fiscal Incentives on Local Government Behavior: An Analysis of 
Fiscal Slack in China. International Public Management Journal, 1-22.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2016.1160014
2 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the determinants of fiscal slack from the perspective of 
Chinese local government officials. Given China’s rapid economic growth over the past 
30-plus years, Chinese local governments reportedly hold huge slack resources that 
attract public scrutiny. In an effort to improve their fiscal performance, some localities 
recently established budget stabilization funds, following a top-down initiative. However, 
it remains unclear to what extent fiscal slack has accumulated and which factors affect 
slack resource levels of Chinese local governments. By employing a panel dataset (249 
prefecture-level cities, 1999–2009), this study finds that political and fiscal factors exert 
significant influence over local officials’ decisions about slack resource levels. The 
findings of the study bear implications for establishing fiscal rules and improving the 
performance of sub-national governments in China and other countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 With the country’s rapid economic growth over the past three decades, Chinese local 
governments have often reportedly shown significant fiscal slack, or unspent budgetary funds at 
the end of a fiscal year, which has attracted great public scrutiny in recent years.1 Local 
governments in China are frequently plagued by the unexpected problem of delays in spending 
and the accumulation of significant year-end fiscal balances (Ma and Yu 2012). On the one hand, 
these slack resources suggest that Chinese local governments are generally situated in a strong 
fiscal position with abundant resources to tap into when dealing with emergencies such as the 
Great Recession. On the other hand, huge amounts of unused resources cause concerns over 
government operational efficiency and inadequate capacity in budget implementation. The public 
and the research community have therefore begun to question why these governments do not 
spend their resources as budgeted (Ma and Yu 2012).2 
 Since 1994 China has used a highly centralized revenue system and fairly decentralized 
expenditure assignments to local governments; thus far, the country has not fully adopted open, 
democratic mechanisms for budgetary decision making or for the oversight of budget execution. 
In this financial administrative structure, local governments in China face distinctive political 
and fiscal incentives related to fiscal operations from their counterparts in Western countries. In 
addition, Chinese local governments’ fiscal behavior, reform strategies, and outcomes are mainly 
determined by China’s political and economic institutions (Xu 2011). Based on the foregoing, 
this study investigates the role of local governments in financial administration in the Chinese 
governance structure. 
 Scholars generally agree that the quality of political and economic institutions is 
important for reform and development, because it determines the incentives for government 
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officials and all the players in an economy. Standard theory would suggest that, under poor 
institutions in consequence of a lack of democratic accountability and an absence of the rule of 
law, Chinese officials would not commit to promoting reform and development. However, the 
sharp contrast between China’s “poor” institutions and its remarkable performance3 poses 
serious challenges to our general understanding of the mechanics of these institutions. Without a 
thorough understanding of the working mechanisms of institutions in developing countries, 
China’s performance becomes inexplicable (Xu 2011). 
Numerous studies have attempted to explain China’s incredible performance in reform 
and development since 1978. Nevertheless, none of them has examined what factors affect the 
level of the year-end balances experienced by Chinese local governments. As the frontline body 
in the provision of public services, local governments ideally should uphold the policy 
inclination to act countercyclically to stabilize their budgets, or service provisions, because 
recessions are the exact time when local residents rely on basic public services to be steadfast so 
that they can overcome financial and employment hardships (Hou 2010). As observed by Dothan 
et al. (2013), the provision of stability is central to government purpose, with the management of 
risk and uncertainty as its basic function; thus, the goal of government budget process is stability. 
In the United States, the “adoption, maintenance, and prudent use of budgetary stabilization 
funds have become fundamental precepts of municipal financial management” (Snow, Gianakis, 
and Haughton 2015, p.304). In China, the effort to establish an institutionalized fiscal reserve 
system for sub-national governments began fairly recently. To improve fiscal performance, 
following an initiative of the central government in 2007 some province-level governments 
began to establish budget stabilization funds, and sub-provincial governments may follow suit.4 
Only in recent years have scholars begun to investigate the management of fiscal slack in local 
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governments. There is a growing body of literature on this topic, but the variables that influence 
the size of financial reserves are poorly understood (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015). Two 
decades after the overhaul of its fiscal system in 1994, China has finally set a timetable to finish 
major fiscal and tax reform tasks by 2016, and to establish a modern fiscal system by 2020 
(China Daily 2014). Thus, this study not only fills a niche in the literature, but also offers timely 
and important practical implications. 
By using a panel dataset of 249 prefectural city governments from 1999 to 2009, this 
study aims to answer an important research question: Which political and fiscal factors influence 
Chinese local government behaviors concerning fiscal slack? The investigation of the working 
mechanisms of the institutions concerned with financial administration in Chinese local 
governments will contribute to improving our theoretical understanding of what constitutes an 
institution and of the quality of such institutions in developing countries. Policy 
recommendations based on such an analysis would also enhance institutional capacity building 
of other developing countries facing similar challenges in their process of reform and 
development.  
This analysis chooses to focus on prefectural city governments for the following two 
reasons:5 First, sub-provincial intergovernmental fiscal arrangements are known to vary 
significantly because the central government does not exert tight control over them; thus, 
provincial governments enjoy substantial discretion in this regard (Wu and Wang 2013). Local 
governments also provide the majority of public services, with sub-national spending accounting 
for 70 percent of total spending, with 55 percent of that amount spent by sub-provincial 
governments (World Bank 2002). Therefore, prefectural city governments play a uniquely 
significant role in China’s reform and development. Second, their sample size (17 prefectures 
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and 283 prefecture-level cities in 2006) is much larger than that of provincial-level governments 
(31), which will help to disentangle patterns of local government behavior that could not be 
revealed at the aggregate national or provincial levels. 
The remainder of the paper is organized into six sections. The next section reviews 
existing literature on the determinants of local government fiscal slack in both Western countries 
and China. Section Three discusses the effects of political and fiscal incentives on local fiscal 
slack in China and presents hypotheses for empirical testing. Section Four presents model, data, 
and methodology, followed by a discussion of the study’s empirical results in Section Five. The 
final section offers conclusions and recommendations. 
 
DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL FISCAL SLACK 
 State and local governments in the United States accumulate fiscal slack via either formal 
“rainy day funds” or informal means such as year-end balances of the general fund, other 
governmental funds, and enterprise funds (Wang and Hou 2012). Local governments do not use 
rainy day funds as widely as state governments (Hou 2008); instead, they primarily rely on fund 
balances as a buffer against natural disasters and revenue shortfalls to help stabilize tax and fee 
rates as well as public service levels (Coe 2007; Marlowe 2005; Shelton and Tyer 2000). Fund 
balance is often used as an indicator of local fiscal health; balance levels are also an important 
factor to consider for local long-term financial planning. State laws and regulations often 
prescribe appropriate levels of fund balances (Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) 
2002). Credit rating agencies closely examine multiple measures of local fund balance when they 
assess local governments’ creditworthiness. The GFOA (2002) recommends that state and local 
governments establish a formal policy on the appropriate level of unreserved fund balance in the 
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general fund. 
There is a small, but growing, body of literature regarding the factors that affect the size 
of the fund balances of local governments in the United States. This literature is in its early 
stages (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015) and still needs to “develop a theoretical model that 
incorporates relevant managerial, organizational, and political features” (Hendrick 2006, p.43). 
Previous studies did not identify many common factors that affected the size of the fund balance 
maintained by local governments. By employing panel data on Chicago suburban municipalities, 
Hendrick (2006) finds that current fiscal condition has a strong impact on municipal fund 
balances, debt levels have a significant negative effect, larger governments tend to accumulate 
fewer reserves than smaller ones, and politically conservative, reformed, and professional 
governments are more likely to accumulate fiscal slack. In addition, municipalities that have a 
greater reliance on intergovernmental revenues have lower levels of reserves because these 
municipalities may not consider reliance on intergovernmental revenues as a risky condition. In 
contrast, Ványalós (2005) finds that New York school districts tend to build up large fund 
balances as a response to state aid uncertainties, which are caused by late budgets.  
Wang and Hou (2012) find that county tax revenues and wealth are positively associated 
with savings, while capital outlay and unemployment reduce savings in North Carolina counties. 
Steward (2009) shows that the unreserved fund balance of Mississippi counties is affected by 
different factors during times of relative abundance and of relative resource scarcity; the fiscal, 
demographic, and political factors included in her model could explain little variation in fund 
balance. Stewart (2011) argues that fund balance levels should be determined by the political, 
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financial and environmental characteristic of each jurisdiction, rather than by a standard 
benchmark recommended for all jurisdictions. According to the study of Duncombe and Hou 
(2014) on New York school districts, savings strategies vary across different types of districts. In 
addition, the determinants of reserved fund balances are similar to those for unreserved fund 
balances, indicating that school districts consider both types of funds while make savings 
decisions. 
Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) find that variations in stabilization fund balances 
can be explained by a community’s political culture and financial management capacity. 
Communities with stronger anti-tax and pro-spending sentiments are found to have lower 
stabilization fund balances. For voters with an anti-tax political disposition, balances represent 
unnecessary taxation, whereas these balances stand for foregone spending for voters who possess 
a pro-spending political disposition. Stronger financial management capacity also contributes to 
maintaining higher stabilization fund balances. 
Gore (2009) shows that a higher variation in revenues, more limited revenue sources, and 
higher population growth in municipalities are associated with higher levels of cash balances. 
Municipalities with high cash levels, or excess cash, spend substantially more on administrative 
expenses, manager salaries, and bonuses, but there is no evidence that excess cash is used to 
lower tax rates. The findings raise the potential ethical dilemma of professional financial 
managers possibly pursuing their own savings agenda that benefits themselves at the expense of 
citizens. Therefore, while slack resources, such as rainy day funds, can provide a cushion against 
revenue fluctuations, in the extreme they may be associated with agency problems between 
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municipal managers and citizens. Similarly, local government officials in China may be subject 
to the same agency problems; they are likely under certain circumstances to make decisions 
about slack resources in order to advance their personal benefits.  
Only two studies relevant to local fiscal balances in China are found in the literature. Ma 
and Yu (2012) examine why money cannot be spent as budgeted. They find that since China’s 
1999 budget reform, governments at all levels have been plagued by the problem of spending 
delays that result in the accumulation of large amounts of unspent year-end balances. This could 
be good news for the government because it indicates that the budgetary controls established by 
the reform have helped to curb misallocation, embezzlement, and the diversion of budgetary 
resources, as well as other forms of malfeasance that had been persistent under the previous 
budgeting system. However, this could also be bad news because it indicates low operational 
efficiency and ineffective policy implementation. Spending delays early in the year often cause 
wasteful spending near the year end. Ma and Yu (2012) observe from their fieldwork in 
provincial and municipal budgeting that unexpected under-expenditures occur “not because the 
new budgeting system has exercised too much control but because the new system is not yet 
effective in exerting budgetary controls” (p. 83). This problem loomed large mainly due to weak 
legislative and administrative controls and inadequate budgeting capacity, among other reasons. 
Echoing this study, Deng and Peng (2011) also report that Chinese local governments 
consistently underestimate their revenue growth by a substantial margin, generating huge 
year-end slack, and that additional government spending funded by the slack strays completely 
free of legislative review and approval. They recommend a major budgetary reform to strengthen 
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the legal authority of the budget, as well as accountability in the public sector. 
 
THE CASE OF CHINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LOCAL FISCAL SLACK 
 The literature has grown in the past several decades on the political economy of fiscal 
policy, particularly fiscal balance and debt accumulation, in both developed and developing 
countries. This study presents hypotheses concerning the factors that affect local fiscal slack 
based on two main lines of arguments presented in this literature. The first argument states that 
fiscal policy, meaning government fiscal slack in the context of this study, is determined by 
opportunistic policymakers whose choices are made with the intention of maximizing voter 
support. The second argument holds that fiscal and budgetary institutions matter to policymakers 
when making fiscal choices (Eslava 2006). Given that China has yet fully to establish democratic 
mechanisms of popular elections and budgetary decision making, local government officials face 
distinctive incentives when formulating fiscal policies compared with their Western counterparts. 
In comparison to those in democratic systems facing electoral incentives, in the Chinese 
governance structure, local officials are held accountable to performance criteria specified by 
officials from above. Therefore, based on the first argument, this study proposes hypotheses 
concerning the political incentives faced by local officials when making fiscal choices in the 
specific context of China. Moreover, in accordance with the second argument, it proposes 
hypotheses regarding the impact of fiscal incentives resulting from the intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements on local officials’ decisions on fiscal slack. 
 Attempting to explain China’s rapid economic growth, scholars have noted the important 
role played by local officials in building infrastructure, promoting businesses, and attracting 
foreign investment. The “helping hand” (pro-business role) of Chinese local officials contrasts 
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sharply with the “grabbing hand” (rent-seeking behavior) of local officials in other transitional 
and developing countries (Krueger 1974; Frye and Shleifer 1997; Li and Zhou 2005). Scholars 
have put forward two principal explanations for the different behaviors of Chinese local officials. 
The first, known as “market-preserving federalism,” suggests that fiscal decentralization and 
intergovernmental fiscal revenue-sharing contracts from 1980 to 1993 provided strong fiscal 
incentives for provincial officials to promote economic growth (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 
1996; Li and Zhou 2005). The central government signed revenue-sharing contracts with 
provincial governments that essentially made the latter the residual claimants of the budgetary 
revenue. Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2005) confirm that the “fiscal contracts system” substantially 
strengthened the fiscal incentives of provincial governments, which generally contributed to 
provincial economic development. By comparing studies of federalism the Chinese style and 
federalism the Russian style, they find that the crucial difference concerns the fiscal incentives 
provided for local governments to pursue market-supporting activities.  
Nevertheless, local officials in China continued to promote economic development even 
after the central government restructured central–provincial fiscal relations in its own favor with 
the 1994 and 2002 revenue-centralizing tax reforms (Tao et al. 2010; Su et al. 2012).6 This takes 
us to the second explanation that focuses on the effect of political incentives, or the career path, 
of local officials in China, in comparison to the focus of the first explanation on fiscal incentives 
(Li and Zhou 2005).7 According to this view, the personnel management reform that proceeded 
alongside the financial and tax reforms, but has long been overlooked in the literature, is equally 
important. After the 1980s’ personnel reform, the central government used personnel control 
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measures to motivate local officials to pursue local economic growth; in other words, it promoted 
or demoted officials according to their performance in terms of GDP growth. Li and Zhou (2005) 
provide empirical evidence that the likelihood of the promotion (termination) of provincial 
leaders is positively (negatively) associated with provincial GDP growth. Chen, Li, and Zhou 
(2005) also find that the turnover of provincial leaders hinges on provincial economic 
performance relative to that of their immediate predecessors. 
Rather than focusing on fiscal or political incentives alone, later studies reveal that both 
types of incentives have been influential in determining local officials’ behaviors. Chinese local 
governments have focused on urbanization as a consequence of the recentralization of revenues 
by the central government in 1994 and 2002, which no longer made it profitable for them to 
continue to promote rural industrialization. To compensate for the lost local revenue resulting 
from the tax reforms, local governments have been assigned exclusive rights to the business tax 
that consists primarily of taxes levied upon the construction and real estate industries, as well as 
the service sector. The monopoly right assigned by the central government to local governments 
over the conversion of farmland to non-arable usages has also brought “windfall profits” to local 
governments, thanks to escalating land prices on the one hand and artificially low compensation 
to farmers on the other. Therefore, the revenues generated from the business tax and the farmland 
conversion process have provided local governments with powerful fiscal incentives to urbanize 
China. Since urbanization contributes to promoting local GDP growth, it also enhances the 
prospects of local officials’ career advancement (Xu 2011; Kung, Xu, and Zhou 2013). 
In order to explain local officials’ behaviors during China’s reform and development, we 
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need to understand the fundamental differences between a federal state and the regionally 
decentralized authoritarian regime in China, which is characterized by a combination of political 
centralization and economic regional decentralization in its governance structure (Xu 2011). 
China’s political and economic institutions determine the incentive structures under which local 
officials operate. On the one hand, the governance of economic matters is mostly delegated to 
sub-national governments. Regional economies, including provinces, municipalities, and 
counties, are relatively self-contained, and sub-national governments are assigned the power to 
initiate and coordinate reforms, provide public services, and make and enforce laws within their 
jurisdictions. This feature makes the Chinese economy qualitatively different from a typical 
centrally planned economy. On the other hand, the highly centralized Chinese political and 
personnel governance structure fundamentally distinguishes the Chinese regime from fiscal 
federalism. Chinese local officials do not face pressure due to voice, exit, or election in a system 
of fiscal federalism. Instead, they face strong incentives to meet the career advancement criteria 
defined by officials from above (Xu 2011). 
The Chinese central government maintains its influence over local officials’ incentives by 
determining their career paths (Huang 1996; Landry 2008; Xu 2011). The central government 
makes decisions concerning the appointment, promotion, demotion, and removal of provincial 
governors. It grants each level of sub-national government the power to make such decisions for 
key officials one level below it. This nested network extends the central government’s personnel 
control measures to all tiers of sub-national government (Burns 1994). Each level of government 
stipulates a set of performance criteria for leading officials one level below. Local officials are 
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then evaluated based on important tasks and targets specified in the performance contract signed 
with their superiors (Tsui and Wang 2004). Moreover, the rotation and cross-regional transfer of 
local leaders are commonly used practices to enhance the effectiveness of the personnel control 
system (Xu, Wang, and Shu 2007). This personnel control approach is the major instrument 
employed by the central government to provide incentives for local officials to promote reform 
and development within their regions. Indeed, the intimate relationship between the performance 
of local officials and their career prospects is well documented in previous empirical studies 
(Kung, Xu, and Zhou 2013). 
Within the growth-based promotion path, prefectural leaders as rational individuals might 
adjust local fiscal behavior in order to maximize their own political and personal benefits as 
“agents” of the “principal” of higher-level governments (Guo 2009; Rosen 1986), similar to the 
agency problems of municipal managers discussed in Gore (2009) in the American context. 
Therefore, this study develops two hypotheses with political variables for empirical tests. The first 
political variable, the party secretary’s distance to mandatory retirement, is calculated by 
subtracting the party secretary’s age from the mandatory retirement age of 60 for prefectural 
officials. When a party secretary is in an early stage of his or her career, he or she may have 
stronger incentives to increase spending for growth in order to accelerate local development, 
which leaves fewer slack resources available for other purposes. 
H1: The local party secretary’s distance to mandatory retirement has a negative impact 
on local slack levels. 
 The second political variable, the party secretary’s tenure, is measured as the local 
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political leader’s accumulated time in office (in months) by the end of the observation year.8 It 
takes time for a new leader to settle in, and there is always a time lag in budgetary 
decision-making and implementation. Therefore, the longer a political leader stays in office in a 
prefecture, the more likely he or she is capable of mobilizing financial resources and tapping into 
slack resources for promoting local economic development, thereby enhancing his or her 
prospects of career advancement. In comparison with the continuity and stability of public 
service programs, economic development is a more important target for the prefectural leaders’ 
performance evaluation.9 
H2: The local party secretary’s tenure has a negative impact on local slack levels. 
Based on the above discussion, fiscal incentives have actively shaped the behavior of 
local officials in the processes of industrialization and urbanization in China. Here, this study 
proposes three hypotheses concerning intergovernmental fiscal arrangements to identify the 
effects of fiscal factors on local fiscal slack levels. Previous studies in the United States have 
found mixed empirical results about the impact of intergovernmental grants on fiscal balance 
(Hendrick 2006; Ványalós 2005). In China, there is often uncertainty about the allocation of 
money from above, and thus prefectural governments may set aside resources as a cushion against 
this uncertainty. For empirical testing, this study formulates the following hypothesis: 
H3: The reliance on fiscal transfers exerts a positive impact on local slack levels. 
 The 1994 reform in China made arrangements for central–provincial revenue sharing, but 
it did not have an impact on fiscal arrangements below the province level. The Chinese central 
government does not strictly control the assignment of sub-provincial revenue and expenditure. 
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Consequently, provincial governments enjoy substantial discretion in this regard (Wu and Wang 
2013). Since the geographic areas of many Chinese provinces are comparable to those of European 
countries, intra-provincial diversity in socio-economics and variation in intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements are both tremendous. Sub-provincial decentralization is much more diversified 
across provinces in China than what is typically found in many other countries (Dollar and 
Hofman 2008). Local governments, particularly at the sub-provincial level, are assigned a hefty 
share of the responsibility for the provision of the bulk of public services. As a result, China ranks 
as one of the most decentralized countries in the world in terms of its expenditure assignments 
(Dabla-Norris 2005). Recent research (Wu and Wang 2013) shows substantial variation in 
sub-provincial expenditure decentralization, calculated as the share of sub-provincial expenditure 
in total provincial and sub-provincial expenditure. Higher degrees of expenditure decentralization, 
or more spending responsibilities for local governments, are expected to lead to lower local fiscal 
slack levels. 
H4: Expenditure decentralization in a province negatively affects local slack levels. 
Similarly, sub-provincial revenue decentralization, or the share of sub-provincial revenue 
in total provincial and sub-provincial revenue, varies significantly across provinces. Tax reforms 
have been recommended to secure revenue adequacy and fiscal autonomy of local governments 
(Dabla-Norris 2005). Greater revenue decentralization results in enhanced local revenue capacity. 
Therefore, revenue decentralization is hypothesized to lead to higher slack levels. 
H5: Revenue decentralization in a province positively affects local slack levels. 
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MODEL, DATA, AND METHODS 
Dependent Variables 
This study develops two dependent variables to test the hypotheses proposed above. The 
first is the ratio of fiscal slack, or accumulated budget surplus over the years, to total budgetary 
revenue (including intergovernmental transfers). The second variable is per capita real fiscal 
slack in Chinese Renminbi (CNY). These two variables, in share and amount, respectively, 
capture the importance and volume of slack resources in each prefecture. 
Independent Variables 
 The independent variables are comprised of major political and fiscal factors as well as 
control variables for prefectural features. To test H1 and H2, similar to Liang and Langbein (2015) 
and Li and Zhou (2005), this analysis includes two political variables, namely a prefectural party 
secretary’s distance to mandatory retirement and his or her tenure in that local political leadership 
position. The first fiscal variable included in the model is transfer dependency, measured as the 
share of transfers from higher-level governments in prefectural expenditure; this is to test H3. The 
model contains two decentralization measures, of expenditure and revenue, at the provincial level, 
to test H4 and H5. Expenditure decentralization is the share of sub-provincial outlays in the sum of 
provincial and sub-provincial outlays; revenue decentralization is the share of sub-provincial 
revenues in the sum of provincial and sub-provincial revenues.  
 We also include a number of socio-economic and demographic variables as controls in the 
model. The revenue ratio, calculated as the share of local revenue to GDP, indicates the revenue 
capacity of prefectural governments: those with higher revenue capacity would be expected to 
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have more fiscal slack. Per capita real GDP measures the local level of economic development: a 
prefecture with a higher level of economic development is more likely to accumulate more fiscal 
slack. Population is a control for the size of each jurisdiction. As urbanization provides powerful 
fiscal and political incentives for local government officials, urbanization level, which is 
measured as the percentage of the registered urban population (with urban hukou) in the total 
population, is included in the models as a control variable.10 The ratios of secondary and tertiary 
industries are proxies for local economic and industrial structures. As indicated by previous 
research (for example, Hendrick (2006)), debt levels have a significant negative impact on fiscal 
slack. Unfortunately, the magnitude of local government indebtedness in China remains a puzzle 
due to the lack of reliable public data (He, Lin, and Tao 2014).11 
The dataset is a panel of 249 prefectural city governments from 1999 to 2009. The 
sample is 89 percent of the total number of prefectural governments located in 22 provinces and 
autonomous regions; all types of jurisdictions at this level in the country are well-represented in 
the dataset.12 The sample years cover almost the entire window of time since the 1994 tax 
restructuring to the most recent year for which data are readily available. Fiscal variables are 
collected from the official and authoritative Compendium of Fiscal Statistics for Prefectures, 
Cities, and Counties and the Finance Yearbook of China. The two political variables are 
collected from online sources.13 Data on the other control variables are taken from China Data 
Online. Table 1 provides the definitions and data sources of the variables used in this analysis 
and Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
The mean value of per capita fiscal slack is CNY 289,14 ranging from the lowest of 
negative CNY 214 to a very high value of CNY 3,864. The fiscal slack ratio averages 13 percent 
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in the sample period, ranging from -71 percent to 93 percent (see Table 2). The distribution of 
these two measures shows significant variation among prefectures by their respective levels of 
economic development. Figure 1 provides a summary of the variation across four regions – 
coastal, northeast, central, and western. Localities along the east coast, China’s most-affluent 
region, hold the highest average fiscal slack, reaching CNY 427 in the sample period, while 
those in central China hold only less than half that amount on average. Northeast and western 
localities have an average of CNY 237 and CNY 226, respectively. Fiscal slack ratios also vary 
across the four regions, ranging from a high of nearly 18 percent for the coastal localities to a 
low of 8 percent in the northeast. Figure 2 presents the sample-wise average slack resources by 
year. The real per capita amount increases substantially from CNY 147 in 1999 to CNY 558 in 
2009, an increase of 280 percent. In the same period, the fiscal slack ratio increases from below 
12 percent in 1999 to over 16 percent in 2009. 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
METHODOLOGY 
To identify the determinants of local slack resource levels, this analysis estimates the 
following model: 
y𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑡 +α𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where y, the dependent variable, is either the ratio or amount of local fiscal slack; x is a matrix of 
explanatory variables; α
𝑖
 is prefecture-fixed effects; 𝛿𝑡 represents year-fixed effects; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is the random error term. Diagnostic statistics show the presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity in the model; prefecture-clustered standard errors are therefor used to control 
for heteroskedasticity and intra-prefecture error correlation. 
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 Because local financial management involves activities and interactions that span 
multiple levels of the government hierarchy, dual-level modeling is employed for this empirical 
analysis. The first level is prefecture and the second level is province. Since prefectures are 
nested within provinces, prefectures in one province are more similar to one another than to 
those in other provinces. A multilevel random coefficient model is estimated, enabling the 
simultaneous examination of relationships at the prefecture level and relationships between 
prefectures and provinces (and the center). This approach models residuals at both the prefectural 
and the provincial levels, and thus it formally adjusts for the nonindependence of prefectures in 
the same province (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). Without modeling such nonindependence, the 
standard errors of the estimates may be biased downward, which, in turn, may result in 
misleading conclusions about the impact of the variables in the model (Selden and Sowa 2004; 
Snijders and Bosker 1999).15 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Table 3 reports the regression results of three models with the share of fiscal slack in total 
revenue as the dependent variable. The first two models are estimated with both prefecture- and 
year-fixed effects; the second and third models control for province-level revenue 
decentralization and expenditure decentralization. Looking at the coefficient estimates from 
Model 2, as expected, the party secretary’s distance to mandatory retirement has a negative 
coefficient and this is significant at the 5 percent level, which suggests that younger local top 
leaders may be motivated to increase expenditures for government-funded projects in order to 
accelerate local development. This is an important measure in the local cadre’s performance 
evaluation, which, in turn, results in a lower level of slack resources. The party secretary’s length 
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of time in the current office is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, H1 is 
supported by the empirical analysis, but H2 is not. 
Transfer dependency is statistically significant at the 1 percent level; a one percentage 
point increase in transfer dependency drives up the share of slack resources by 0.39 percentage 
points. This empirical result provides strong support for H3. With regard to the two 
province-level fiscal variables, expenditure decentralization is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level; its negative coefficient suggests that the higher expenditure responsibilities of 
prefectural cities lead to a lower share of fiscal slack. The coefficient on revenue decentralization 
is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Therefore, the empirical results support H4 
for expenditure decentralization, although not H5 for revenue decentralization. 
As expected, the revenue ratio is highly significant and positively correlated with the 
dependent variable, indicating that a stronger revenue capacity of prefectural cities may 
contribute to a higher share of fiscal slack. The coefficient for population is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level: a larger population size is associated with a higher slack ratio; 
no scale economy is observed here.16 The urbanization level is not statistically significant; 
however, other measures that can better capture prefectural urbanization activities need to be 
explored in future research. The other control variables in the model are not statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
For the multilevel analysis, following previous studies (for example, Heinrich 2002), the 
intra-class correlation coefficient is calculated based on an unconditional model, which does not 
include any covariates in the prefecture-level or province-level sub-models. The result indicates 
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that 26.7 percent of variation in the dependent variable is attributable to the province-level 
random intercept, and that the variation is substantive and statistically significant. 
The results from the multilevel random coefficient model (Model 3) are consistent with 
those from the first two models. The coefficients with regard to the party secretary’s distance to 
retirement, transfer dependency, expenditure decentralization, the revenue ratio, and population 
are statistically significant and have the same signs as those from Models 1 and 2. In addition, 
GDP, the secondary industry ratio, and the tertiary industry ratio are also highly significant with 
a positive sign, indicating the positive relationship of these three variables to slack resources. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 Then the dependent variable of real per capita fiscal slack is used to estimate the same 
fixed effects and multilevel random coefficient models, with the results shown in Table 4. The 
results are mostly consistent with those discussed in Table 3. The party secretary’s distance to 
retirement remains significant in the multilevel analysis, though it loses statistical significance in 
the fixed effects models. The party secretary’s tenure has an expected negative sign and becomes 
significant at the 10 percent level in the multilevel model. Transfer dependency remains highly 
significant in all three models. Expenditure decentralization is significant at the 1 percent level in 
Model 2. Similarly, revenue decentralization has an expected positive sign and is highly 
significant in Model 2, which suggests that the higher revenue capacity of prefectural cities may 
contribute to higher slack resource levels. Budgetary revenue ratio and GDP are highly 
significant in all three models with the expected positive coefficients. In general, the results are 
robust to varying specifications in models with either of the two dependent variables. 
[Table 4 about here] 
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CONCLUSION 
 By employing a panel dataset of a large number of prefectural governments in China for 
an extended period of time, this study has aimed to examine the effects of political and fiscal 
incentives on local government behavior concerning fiscal slack in China. It improves our 
understanding of the working mechanisms of institutions for financial administration in China, 
so that we can better explain local government officials’ behaviors in reform and development. 
Based on previous studies of the political economy of fiscal policy, this study formulated several 
hypotheses for empirical testing. It developed a model that comprises some major political, fiscal, 
and socio-economic factors to explain local governments’ volume and share of fiscal slack in the 
total budget in the context of a distinctively Chinese political and administrative structure. The 
empirical results of the analysis indicate the importance of political incentives in local fiscal 
decisions. The personnel control system that holds local officials accountable to performance 
measures defined by officials from above may result in unintended consequences in local 
financial administration. This study also suggests that fiscal incentives resulting from 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements influence local governments’ decisions on fiscal slack. 
The reliance on intergovernmental transfers and assignment of expenditure responsibilities may 
significantly affect local slack resource levels. The differences across provinces and interaction 
between provincial and local governments may have a substantial impact on local fiscal 
behavior.  
 Since its last major restructuring in 1994, China’s flawed fiscal system has muddled 
through for over two decades. Now a major fiscal reform has been set in motion, and the 
arrangements to share revenue, spending responsibilities and borrowing authority between the 
center and localities are still under deliberation (Koch-Weser 2014). This study suggests that 
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future reforms need to address the political and fiscal incentives faced by local officials in order 
to improve their performance in managing fiscal slack. The effectiveness of the central 
government’s recent move to include local officials’ mishandling of local finances in 
performance assessment remains to be seen. The upcoming decisions to change the composition 
of local tax revenue and to reconfigure central-local spending obligations (Koch-Weser 2014) 
will surely have a great impact on local actions that concern fiscal slack. 
With the support of more detailed budget data, future studies need to get behind the 
year-end aggregate fiscal balance data and examine the dynamics of budget implementation 
within the fiscal year, the strategic considerations of revenue estimation by local officials, and 
the incentive mechanisms for local revenue and spending decisions. Further research in this area 
will shed additional insight into the ongoing reform of China’s fiscal and budgetary systems and 
improve its capacity in budget control and implementation. 
The results of this study are still preliminary due to data limitations. More exhaustive 
research, with better data, is necessary to help create effective fiscal rules for establishing an 
institutionalized fiscal reserve system for sub-national governments in China. This would greatly 
benefit the development of their countercyclical fiscal capacity and ensure the continuation of 
China’s remarkable economic growth. 
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Notes: 
                                                             
1 Local governments in China refer to all sub-national levels of government in this study. 
2 In recent years, the international market and academic circles have kept a keen watch on Chinese governments’ 
debts, particularly local government debts. The debt finance of Chinese local governments is completely devoid of 
fiscal transparency (Ma 2013). Local governments had not been formally granted the authority to borrow until the 
recent revision of the Budget Law in 2014. Thus, local government debts have accumulated mainly in the form of 
contingent liabilities, which are operated off budget (Ma 2013). By establishing local financing vehicles as 
off-budget entities, local governments have circumvented legal constraints and incurred considerable debts with 
explicit and implicit government guarantees and obligations for repayment if the capital projects were to fail. Due to 
the lack of reliable public data, it remains difficult to track local government indebtedness in China (He, Lin, and 
Tao 2014). Most debt revenues of Chinese local governments have been used for long-term infrastructure 
investment rather than for operating purposes (Ma 2013). 
3 Since implementing its reform and open-door policy in 1978, China has maintained an average annual GDP 
growth rate of over 9 percent (Ding and Knight 2009; Prasad and Rajan 2006; Prasad 2009). According to some 
sources, few countries have matched China’s growth rate over the same period of time. 
4 See http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-07/05/content_25826944.htm. 
5 The Chinese government system is comprised of five hierarchical levels: the center, provinces, prefectures, 
counties, and townships (Chen 2009; Wong 1997). There exists a strict vertical hierarchy among the five levels in 
fiscal (as well as other) affairs (Shah and Shen 2008). For example, prefectures fall directly under their respective 
provincial administration (Wong 1997). 
6 The 1994 tax reform gave the central government 75 percent of the value added tax and provinces and their 
localities the remaining 25 percent. Provinces and their localities were ordered to give 50 percent of personal and 
enterprise income tax to the central government in 2002 and 60 percent in 2003 (Kung, Xu, and Zhou 2013; Shih 
and Zhang 2007). 
7 Similarly, some studies in the Western literature examine the link between the re-election probabilities of U.S. 
gubernatorial officials and their choices of economic policy and the career concerns of firm managers (Besley and 
Case 1995; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993). 
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8 The study includes the two variables of a city party secretary rather than a mayor in the models due to some 
practical considerations. Under China’s party-state political system, the concentration of power in the hands of city 
party secretaries, nicknamed first-in-command (yibashou in Chinese), grants them more control over socioeconomic 
policies in their jurisdictions than mayors. 
9 For the evaluation of local leaders, work achievement accounts for 60 to 70 percent of performance, while other 
aspects, such as political integrity and competence, account for the remainder. Competition between local officials at 
the same level is an essential part of the personnel control system, as their performance ranking among peers is 
directly linked to their chances for promotion (Edin 2003). 
10 The hukou, a household registration system in China, divides residents into two categories: urban and rural hukou 
holders. This system ties residents’ access to benefits and services to their residential status, which puts rural 
residents in a disadvantageous position. For several newly developed cities in the Pearl River delta, including 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Zhongshan, and Dongguan, all of their permanent residents constitute the urban hukou holders. 
Thus, their values for the urbanization level variable are 100 percent. 
11 The absence of debt level variable may generate an omitted variable bias problem. For this analysis, the inclusion 
of prefecture- and year-fixed effects in estimation at least partly removes the effect of omitted variable bias. 
12 The four municipalities directly under the central government are excluded from this analysis. Prefectural cities 
in regions mainly for ethnic minority groups, including Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinhai, Ningxia, and Yunnan in western 
China, are also excluded because they operate quite differently from other cities and there are missing data for some 
major variables. 
13 Data on the two political variables are garnered from two websites: http://baike.baidu.com/ and 
http://www.hotelaah.com/liren/index.html. Cross-checking with other data sources was carried out to ensure 
accuracy and reliability. 
14 The exchange rate between the U.S. Dollar and CNY has been approximately 6.20 in recent years. 
15 For a more detailed discussion of the method, please see Heinrich (2002). 
16 When population squared is included in the model, the result is not statistically significant and does not change 
the sign of the coefficient on population. 
Table 1. Definition and Data Sources of Variables 
  
Variable  Definition Data Source 
Fiscal slack amount Accumulated budget surplus per capita in 
real CNY 
Compendium of Fiscal 
Statistics for Prefectures, 
Cities, and Counties 
(1999-2009) 
Fiscal slack ratio % of accumulated budget surplus in total 
budgetary revenue 
Calculated by authors 
Party secretary's distance to 
  mandatory retirement 
60 minus a prefectural party secretary’s 
age 
Online sources 
Party secretary's tenure Prefectural party secretary’s accumulated 
time in office (in months) by the end of 
that year 
Same as above 
Transfer dependency % of fiscal transfer from upper-level 
government in local budgetary 
expenditure (measured at the prefectural 
level) 
Compendium of Fiscal 
Statistics for Prefectures, 
Cities, and Counties 
(1999-2009) 
Expenditure decentralization Expenditure share of sub-provincial 
governments in a province (measured at 
the provincial level) 
Finance Yearbook of 
China (1999-2009) 
Revenue decentralization Revenue share of sub-provincial 
governments in a province (measured at 
the provincial level) 
Same as above 
Revenue ratio % of local budgetary revenue in GDP Compendium of Fiscal 
Statistics for Prefectures, 
Cities, and Counties 
(1999-2009) 
GDP  Real GDP per capita (in ,000 real CNY) China Data Online (1999-
2009) 
Population Total population at year end (in millions) Same as above 
Urbanization level 
 
Secondary industry ratio  
% of non-agricultural population in the 
total population 
% of secondary industry output in GDP 
Same as above 
 
Same as above 
Tertiary industry ratio  % of tertiary industry output in GDP Same as above 
  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (1999-2009) 
     Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Fiscal slack amount 289.22 380.41 -214.23 3,864.10 
Fiscal slack ratio 13.43 12.08 -70.81 93.35 
Party secretary’s distance to retirement 8.46 3.85 0.00 22.00 
Party secretary's tenure (in months) 29.97 20.34 1.00 129.00 
Transfer dependency 59.29 26.50 0.00 147.85 
Expenditure decentralization 77.33 7.32 53.23 89.23 
Revenue decentralization 79.62 7.88 55.20 94.49 
Revenue ratio 4.29 2.20 0.12 24.52 
GDP (in ,000 real CNY) 22.02 18.53 2.16 183.73 
Population (in millions) 1.19 1.02 0.17 8.01 
Urbanization level 32.45 16.31 9.60 100 
Secondary industry ratio  50.14 12.15 8.04 90.10 
Tertiary industry ratio  41.13 9.81 7.90 80.90 
Notes: The number of observation is 2133. All financial variables are adjusted for 
inflation. 
  
 Table 3. Determinants of Fiscal Slack Ratio (1999-2009) 
   Model 
 
Fixed Effects Multilevel 
Explanatory Variable 1 2 3 
  Party secretary's distance to retirement -0.16** -0.15** -0.20*** 
 
(-2.51) (-2.40) (-4.61) 
 Party secretary's tenure -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(-0.50) (-0.72) (-1.24) 
 Transfer dependency (%) 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 
 
(13.29) (14.00) (47.45) 
 Expenditure decentralization 
 
-0.20*** -0.16* 
  
(-2.84) (-1.70) 
 Revenue decentralization 
 
-0.05 -0.02 
  
(-0.72) (-0.23) 
 Budgetary revenue ratio (%) 1.79*** 1.81*** 1.55*** 
 
(6.75) (6.82) (17.18) 
 GDP 0.03 0.03 0.11*** 
 
(1.23) (1.16) (9.95) 
 Population 1.74*** 1.73*** 2.48*** 
 
(3.02) (2.99) (12.71) 
 Urbanization level 0.02 0.03 -0.01 
 
(0.57) (0.76) (-0.85) 
 Secondary industry ratio (%) -0.02 -0.02 0.18*** 
 
(-0.30) (-0.27) (7.22) 
 Tertiary industry ratio (%) -0.13 -0.14 0.07** 
 
(-1.66) (-1.66) (2.56) 
 Constant -11.96* 7.02 -16.51** 
 (-1.71) (0.82) (-2.12) 
    R-squared 0.48 0.49 
 Number of observations 2,133 2,133 2,133 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Both fixed effects models 
controlled for year-fixed effects, but their coefficients are not included in the table. 
 
  
 
Table 4. Determinants of Fiscal Slack Amount (1999-2009) 
 
   Model 
 
Fixed Effects Multilevel 
Explanatory Variable 1 2 3 
  Party secretary's distance to retirement -1.33 -1.00 -3.86*** 
 
(-0.81) (-0.64) (-2.76) 
 Party secretary's tenure -0.00 -0.03 -0.47* 
 
(-0.00) (-0.11) (-1.81) 
 Transfer dependency (%) 7.14*** 7.47*** 8.88*** 
 
(8.36) (8.39) (36.50) 
 Expenditure decentralization 
 
-7.42*** 4.56 
  
(-3.29) (1.33) 
 Revenue decentralization 
 
5.55*** 3.48 
  
(2.91) (1.44) 
 Budgetary revenue ratio (%) 67.58*** 68.48*** 81.32*** 
 
(5.95) (6.16) (28.91) 
 GDP 6.16*** 5.68*** 8.82*** 
 
(3.94) (3.85) (24.20) 
 Population  -26.39 -36.92 33.79*** 
 
(-1.02) (-1.40) (5.39) 
 Urbanization level 2.41 2.22 -1.47 
 
(1.44) (1.31) (-3.19) 
 Secondary industry ratio (%) -1.71 -0.82 6.14*** 
 
(-0.80) (-0.38) (7.81) 
 Tertiary industry ratio (%) -2.52 -1.95 5.86*** 
 
(-1.21) (-0.92) (6.79) 
 Constant -457.44** -437.95* -1,922.42*** 
 (-2.45) (-1.73) (-8.24) 
    R-squared 0.51 0.52 
 Number of observations 2,133 2,133 2,133 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Both fixed effects models 
controlled for year-fixed effects, but their coefficients are not included in the table. 
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Figure 1. Fiscal Slack Amount and Ratio of Prefectural Cities by Region  
(1999-2009) 
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Figure 2. Fiscal Slack Amount and Ratio of Prefectural Cities by Year  
(1999-2009) 
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